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TRIBAL JURISDICTION AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE:
THE NEED FOR NON-INDIAN ACCOUNTABILITY
ON THE RESERVATION
Amy Radon*
Domestic violence is a severe problem for tribes across the nation, as their female
members are victimized at highly disproportionate rates compared to members of
dominant society. Many tribes have sophisticated domestic violence codes to com-
bat the problem, but they are powerless to prosecute the majority of those who will
abuse Indian women: non-Indian men. In 1978 the Supreme Court stripped
tribes of their power to prosecute non-Indians in criminal matters, which not only
damaged tribal sovereignty but also meant the difference between a life free from
abuse and one with constant fear, intimidation, and pain for Indian women.
The federal government has, since that time, had almost exclusive jurisdiction'
over non-Indians who commit crimes on the reservation. Federal prosecutors with
heavy workloads and limited resources often plead out cases of domestic violence
to far lesser crimes or decline to prosecute these offenses at all. Tribes that have the
resources and commitment to stop violence against Indian women are forbidden
to take action against non-Indian offenders. This lack of accountability on the
part of dominant society must stop immediately, and tribes must have the power
to prosecute these non-Indian offenders to provide the protection these women de-
serve.
This Note argues that Congress should restore tribal jurisdiction over non-Indian
criminal offenders. The primary purpose of restoring tribal jurisdiction is to pro-
tect Indian women from abuse by repeat offenders, and ensure these women
receive the justice they deserve. Allowing tribes to assert jurisdiction over non-
Indian offenders will also show that the federal government has not forgotten the
sovereign status of Indian nations, established almost 200 years ago. As sover-
eign nations, tribes should be permitted to enforce laws covering their territory
and ensure justice for their members by responding to the unique problems facing
American Indians. Tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians is essential to accom-
plishing these goals and must be restored by Congress at once.
* B.A. 2001, Arizona State University; J.D. candidate University of Michigan Law
School. The author would like to thank Professor Gavin Clarkson and Cherokee Tribal
ProsecutorJames Kilbourne for their guidance. She would also like to thank Ben Berkman,
Ben Superfine, and Alison Castro for their support.
1275
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
INTRODUCTION
There are men in the United States who can hit, shove, burn, in-
timidate, threaten, and stalk women without any fear of
repercussion. At most, these men may be arrested for the violence
they commit against their wives, girlfriends, and daughters, but
they certainly will not be prosecuted. After a night at the local jail,
or, more likely, ineffective warning by police, the victimizer is free
to do as he pleases. He will not hear from law enforcement officials
again, until the next time a 911 dispatcher receives a frantic call
from a woman who is trying to survive the victimizer's abuse. In too
many cases, the woman will not survive.
If you are a victim of domestic violence in the United States, the
effectiveness of the protection from violence that you receive from
law enforcement depends on which side of the reservation line you
live and whether your victimizer is an American Indian. If you are
an American Indian woman living on a reservation, and are
abused by a non-Indian man, you receive less protection from do-
mestic violence than any other American woman. Additionally, if
you are an American Indian woman, you are more likely to be a
victim of domestic violence than a non-Indian woman.' These
alarming circumstances facing American Indian women are not
due to any failure on the part of tribal governments to do what is
best for its members; nothing could be further from the truth.
Many tribes have sophisticated domestic violence codes in place
and resources available to help victims cope with abuse.2 What the
tribes lack, however, is the most powerful tool to combat the prob-
lem of domestic violence: the power to prosecute these offenders
and hold them accountable for their actions. Tribes do not have
the power to prosecute non-Indian offenders because the Supreme
Court eviscerated tribal jurisdiction over these crimes and desig-
nated the federal government, and only a handful of states, as the
sole authority responsible for prosecuting these crimes. Tribes are
able and eager to protect abused women, but in 1978 the Supreme
Court held in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe that tribes do not
have jurisdiction to prosecute non-Indian criminal offenders.
1. See CALLIE RENNISON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NCJ
176354, SPECIAL REPORT ON VIOLENT VICTIMIZATION AND RACE 1993-1998 9 (2001) (not-
ing the victimization rate for Native women is 23 per 1,000, as opposed to rates of 2 to 12
per 1,000 for non-Native women).
2. Blackfeet Tribal Law and Order Code, Ordinance 82, Domestic Abuse Law Ordi-
nance (1999), The Cherokee Code, Chapter 50B: Domestic Violence Prevention.
3. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
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Oliphant arose out of two charges against non-Indian residents of
the Port Madison Reservation for crimes committed against Indians
on reservation lands. The case was brought before the Supreme
Court to determine whether the tribe could prosecute non-Indians
who committed these crimes against Indians on the tribe's land. The
tribe argued that criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians came from
"retained inherent powers of government over the Port Madison
Indian Reservation."4 However, the Supreme Court ultimately held
that the tribe does not have criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians
because such a holding would be inconsistent with Congressional
and administrative action that suggests otherwise. Since Oliphant
was decided in 1978, tribes have not been able to assert general
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians who commit crimes against
Indians on reservation land, and absent Congressional action,
Oliphant will remain good law.
The relevant legislation bearing on the issue of tribal jurisdic-
tion over non-Indians consists of the General Crimes Ace and Public
Law 280.6 The General Crimes Act grants the federal government
jurisdiction over non-Indians who commit crimes on the reserva-
tion, but it does not speak to concurrent jurisdiction between
tribes and the federal government. Public Law 280 allows states
to assume such jurisdiction over non-Indians by statute or state
constitutional amendment, and extends jurisdiction over reserva-
tion land to five states. Subsequent to this legislation and the
Supreme Court's holding in Oliphant, when tribal police respond
to domestic violence calls, they are able to intervene at that mo-
ment, but tribal prosecutors cannot file charges to hold non-
Indian offenders accountable for their actions. The tribe's only
recourse is to refer matters to federal prosecutors, who are far
removed from the reservation and its population. With heavy
workloads and limited resources, federal prosecutors allow the
more serious crimes to take priority over non-felony domestic
violence crimes. The result is that crimes against Indian women
do not receive adequate attention, and often are not prosecuted
at all. This Note argues for Congressional action to reverse the
decision in Oliphant and grant tribes the power to assert jurisdic-
tion over non-Indians who commit crimes on the reservation. As
this Note will show, tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians is espe-
cially important to combat the epidemic of domestic violence on
4. Id. at 196.
5. 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (1948).
6. Pub. L. No. 280, 67 Stat. 588 (1953) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1162).
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the reservation, and to ensure criminal justice is not based on the
tribal membership of the victim.
Data comparing the number of cases submitted to the Attorney
General for prosecution with the number of cases actually prose-
cuted is not currently available. However, the University of Michigan
is collaborating with the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians
("EBCI") to create a mechanism that will provide the tribe with this
data. The Inter-Governmental Tracking System ("IGTS") will allow
tribal officials to determine the extent to which these crimes go
un-prosecuted, and will illustrate the need for changes in the cur-
rent system to protect Indian women. Project leaders hypothesize
that the research will show that the percentage of cases actually
prosecuted for non-Indian domestic violence or sexual abuse
against Indian women and children is substantially lower than the
prosecution rate for cases with non-Indian victims.7 This data will
prove to Congress that it must take action and give tribes jurisdic-
tion over these crimes against Indian women in order to assure
them that domestic violence will no longer be tolerated.
Part I presents the data that is currently available regarding do-
mestic violence committed against Indian women. These statistics
will expose the alarming victimization rates of American Indian
women as compared to other American women. Included in this
data are findings that the vast majority of these victimizers are non-
Indian men who tribes are powerless to prosecute. Because federal
prosecutors decline to prosecute these crimes, the law provides no
deterrent effect; these women will continue to be victimized at
alarming rates until the courts can protect them. Current federal
treatment of these cases does not provide sufficient protection for
Indian women, thus necessitating a change in the status quo.
Part II provides pertinent background information and exposes
the Supreme Court's misconceptions as to the nature of tribes as
sovereign nations. This Part will describe the history ofjudicial and
congressional action that left tribal courts without jurisdiction to
prosecute non-Indian crimes committed on the reservation.
Dominant society, represented by courts and the legislature, has
actively stripped tribes of their inherent sovereignty since the
1830s, and in the process has created a system that works poorly
for all involved. This Part will also discuss why Oliphant, the case
that expressly denied tribes jurisdiction over non-Indians, was
wrongly decided. Justice to Indian women and fairness to tribes as
7. Asst. Professor Gavin Clarkson, Presentation at the University of Michigan School
of Information (Nov. 4, 2003).
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sovereign nations requires Congressional action to remedy this
situation.
Part III examines the various options available to tribes under Ol-
iphant that could achieve higher prosecution rates for crimes of
domestic violence committed by non-Indians against Indian women.
The first option is to encourage more states to assert jurisdiction
over crimes committed on the reservation. The second option is to
create specialty courts that exclusively handle tribal affairs, or to des-
ignate a federal prosecutor whose sole responsibility is to prosecute
domestic violence committed against Indian women. This Part will
explain why these two options are not in the best interests of tribes
and Indian women, even if they can produce increased prosecution
rates.
Part IV contends that the tribe itself provides the best protection
for Indian women from domestic violence. Tribes like the EBCI
have had sophisticated tribal court systems in place for centuries,
and either already have the resources, or have access to the re-
sources that would allow them to easily assert jurisdiction over
these offenders. One of the major benefits of tribal jurisdiction
over non-Indian offenders would be a cohesive response mecha-
nism of prosecutors and police working together as a unit to
respond to the needs of Indian women. Additionally, tribal juris-
diction over non-Indian offenders would allow tribes to respond to
the unique situations of Indian women, and tailor responses to the
problem of domestic violence based on the particular needs of the
Indian community. Lastly, this solution would strengthen tribal
sovereignty, and restores the status of tribes to that of "domestic
dependent" nations, a term coined by ChiefJustice Marshall over a
century ago. An important facet of this reform is that Indian
women would not be forced to choose between tribal sovereignty
and freedom from violence. For these reasons, tribal sovereignty
over non-Indian offenders is essential to both the protection of
Indian women from domestic violence and the restoration of tribal
sovereignty.
Part V explains why members of dominant society may hesitate
to encourage members of Congress to adopt legislation that will
address the Supreme Court's holding in Oliphant. The concerns of
dominant society include: protection of an individual's rights, lack
of review of tribal court decisions, and the concern that not all
tribes will be able to afford an adequate judiciary. This Part will
address each concern, and explain why these concerns should not
8. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831).
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prevent tribes from asserting criminal jurisdiction over non-
Indians. Congress should take action to allow tribes the power to
protect Indian women by allowing them the ability to prosecute
and hold these offenders accountable for their actions.
PART I
Statistics detailing victimization rates reveal that both male and
female American Indians face much higher occurrences of domes-
tic violence than non-Indians in the United States.9 This pattern
will continue as long as batterers can commit these acts of violence
unpunished, and further abuse their victims without intervention
by the authorities. Non-Indians have an increased presence on al-
lotted tribal lands, as well as on those reservations with casinos and
other venues that draw non-Indians to the reservation. Because of
this presence, Indian women are especially prone to abuse at the
hands of non-Indian men. This Part will explore all of these con-
cerns to illustrate the need for action on behalf of these women
who are not protected to the same extent as members of dominant
society.
The statistics detailing victimization rates among American
Indian women are startling. As one author noted, the empirical
evidence "cries out" with the need to address the severe problem
of domestic violence committed against women on tribal lands.' °
The Bureau of Justice Statistics has compiled information detailing
the rates of "intimate violence," defined as "violent crimes ...
committed against persons by their current or former spouses,
boyfriends, or girlfriends annually."" While this definition, and
therefore the study, includes victimized men in its findings, it is
important to note that the Bureau found that 87% of the victims of
intimate violence studied were female. 2 The Bureau conducted
the study between 1993 and 1998, and found that for every 1,000
American Indian females, 23.2 were victims of intimate violence.
This rate of victimization was nearly double that of African Ameri-
cans (11.2 for every 1,000), triple that of whites (8.1 per 1,000) and
9. See RENNISON, supra note 1.
10. B.J.Jones, Welcoming Tribal Courts Into the Judicial Fraternity: Emerging Issues In Tribal-
State and Tibal-Federal Court Relations, 24 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 457, 495 (1998).
11. RENNISON, supra note 1, at 9.
12. Id.
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twelve times the victimization rate of Asian Americans (1.9 per
1,000).13
What is even more troubling about these statistics is that, unlike
members of dominant society, American Indian women may be
less likely to come forward if victimized, and therefore less able to
receive protection from authorities or support from non-
governmental organizations. "Many Indians choose not to call the
authorities in cases of rape, severe violence, or murder because
such crimes would be handled by the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion."14 Activist Maggie Escovita Steele (Chiricahua Apache)
explains that federal law enforcement agencies "take forever to
come" and the common sentiment among Indian women is that
"nothing's going to happen"'5 with their cases anyway. American
Indian women are not able to rely on the federal government to
provide protection from their victimizers, so it is possible that only
a fraction of violent incidents are reported. Because the nature of
domestic violence is such that the violent acts are more likely to be
repeated than other types of assaults, 6 these victims are vulnerable
to frequent and repeated attacks without any protective or inter-
vening force.
In addition to the statistics detailing the rates of American In-
dian victimization, it is important to understand who the
victimizers are. If Indian men were the primary abusers of Indian
women, tribes would be able to assert jurisdiction over such
crimes, and the remedy to the victimization could be found in
tribal government. However, statistics indicate that non-Indian
men-men who tribal governments and police are powerless to
hold accountable-primarily commit domestic violence against
American Indian women.
As the Bureau of Justice Statistics explains, violent crime is
"primarily interracial" for American Indian victims. 7 The Bureau
found that white offenders committed 58% of crimes against
American Indians, and African American offenders committed
10% of crimes against American Indians. 8 Only 25% of American
Indians categorized their victimizer as "other," which includes, but
13. Id.
14. Rinku Sen, Between a Rock & a Hard Place: Domestic Violence in Communities of Color,
COLORLINES MAGAZINE, Spring 1999, at 27.
15. Id.
16. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEX EQUALITY 716 (2001).
17. RENNISON, supra note 1, at 10.
18. Id.
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it not limited to, American Indian victimizers.' 9 Although these
statistics are not limited to violence committed against women, the
Bureau in an earlier study found that for the specific crimes of
rape and sexual assault, the percentage of crimes committed
against Native American women by members of dominant society
is even more severe. Between 1992-96 "about 9 in 10 American
Indian victims of rape or sexual assault were estimated to have had
assailants who were white or black".20 This translates into tribes
having the power to prosecute at most only 1 in every 10 offenders
who victimize Indian women.
Increased rates of victimization among Indian women may be
related to and dependent upon the fact that the victimizers are
non-Indian men. First, non-Indian men victimize American Indian
women because there is literally nothing stopping them from treat-
ing their partners in any manner they choose. In other words, the
laws against domestic violence have no deterrent effect when it
comes to non-Indian on Indian crimes because these crimes are
not prosecuted. As will be explained in Part II, crimes of domestic
violence committed against American Indian women by non-
Indians must, with a few exceptions, be prosecuted by the Attorney
General of the United States through the United States Attorney's
office in their district. Scholars on this subject agree that due to
heavy caseloads, federal prosecutors simply do not give domestic
violence cases the attention they deserve. 2' The most recent data
available for all crimes referred to federal prosecutors shows that
27% of cases were declined between 2000 and 2001.2 Federal
prosecutors declined to prosecute 35% of all violent offenses; for
the specific crime of assault, federal prosecutors declined to prose-
cute 42.9% of the cases investigated.2' Again, these statistics detail
prosecution rates for all cases referred to the United States Attor-
neys, and do not break down data to accurately convey prosecution
19. Id.
20. LAWRENCE A. GREENFELD & STEVEN K. SMITH, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, AMERICAN INDIANS AND CRIME, IN BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS
NCJ 173386 (1999).
21. See generally Victor Holcomb, Prosecution of Non-Indians for Non-Serious Offenses Com-
mitted Against Indians in Indian Country, 75 N.D. L. REV. 761 (1999); Geoffrey Heisey,
Oliphant and Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction Over Non-Indians: Asserting Congress's Plenary Power to
Restore 7rritorialJurisdiction, 73 IND. L.J. 1051, 1053 (1998);Jones, supra note 10, at 513.
22. BUREAU OFJUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, NCJ 201627, COMPENDIUM
OF FEDERALJUSTICE STATISTICS 2001 23 (2003).
23. Id. at 24, 28. Violent offenses were defined as threatening, attempting, or actually
using physical force against a person, including murder, negligent manslaughter, assault
robbery, sexual abuse, kidnapping, and threats against the President; assault was defined as
intentionally inflicting or attempting or threatening to inflict bodily injury to another per-
son.
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rates for crimes committed on versus off the reservation, or against
men versus women. A break down of these statistics will reveal a
disproportionate declination of prosecution rate when domestic
violence against Indian women is concerned. Domestic violence
cases will take the back seat to murder or other felony cases that
demand more time and resources from federal prosecutors.
Funds for prosecution of federal crimes are finite, requiring
busy prosecutors to allocate their resources as best they can.
As a result, crimes like assaults and [thefts] are simply not
prosecuted, which creates grave problems for tribes attempt-
ing to police their reservation without the power to exercise
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. 4
It is important to remember that, despite their jurisdiction, fed-
eral prosecutors are not required to prosecute crimes of domestic
violence. Prosecutorial discretion means that the government need
not take any action to protect American Indian victims of domestic
violence. As will be explained in Part II, this is especially appall-
ing when one considers that the government has established itself
as the only means of protection for American Indian women, and
26then continues to fail to provide that protection. In this sense, the
federal government "becomes the means by which the wrongdoers
are allowed to operate, and the government is essentially an acces-




An additional problem related to the declination of prosecution
of domestic violence cases is the federal prosecutor's tendency to
inappropriately plead these cases down to charges that in no way
reflect the severity of the violence that occurred. Mending the Sacred
Hoop ("MSH"), a program funded by the National Institute of Jus-
tice working with the Carlton County, Minnesota, Violence
Prevention Council, found that due to lack of resources, federal
prosecutors are faced with "constant pressure to settle cases" with-
out a hearing.8 Out of 18 case files studied by MSH, ten were
pleaded down to lesser charges. "Seven of the ten were negotiated
24. Holcomb, supra note 21, at 767.
25. "Having the power to prosecute such offenses does not mean the government hav-
ing the obligation to do so." Id. at 763.
26. Id. at 768.
27. Id.
28. THOMAS PEACOCK, ET AL., COMMUNITY-BASED ANALYSIS OF THE U.S. LEGAL SYS-
TEM'S INTERVENTION IN DOMESTIC ABUSE CASES INVOLVING INDIGENOUS WOMEN 99 (2003),
available at http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles/nij/grants/199358.pdf (on file with the Univer-
sity of MichiganJournal of Law Reform).
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down to the charge of 'disorderly conduct' ... [y]et the violence
in these cases was quite serious and the injuries sustained by the
victims extensive."2 Pleading these cases down to charges that
amount to little more than a slap on the wrist does not protect In-
dian women from victimization, and sends a message to these
women that the severe violence committed against them is not
recognized as such. This practice is a sorry excuse for justice, and
can no longer be the acceptable government response to cases of
domestic violence.
One must not underestimate the effect of government deter-
rence on the crime of domestic violence, and on the victimization
that occurs when the government allows these batterers to con-
tinually abuse their partners. "The batterer begins and continues
his behavior because violence is an effective method for gaining
and keeping control over another person," and because "he usu-
ally does not suffer negative consequences as a result of his
behavior."3 ° The nature of domestic violence is such that the of-
fender will continue to repeat his offense until stopped. One of the
reasons men abuse is because they can get away with it without
consequence. By not prosecuting these crimes, the federal gov-
ernment allows non-Indian men to continue in their pattern of
abusive behavior, which may explain the high victimization rates
among American Indian women.
In addition to the lack of prosecution of these crimes to provide
a deterrent effect, the lack of response by a law enforcement
agency also perpetuates the problem of domestic violence. Many
tribal police forces have a policy against arresting non-Indians who
abuse female tribal members, because the tribes have no authority
to prosecute these individuals.3 The Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion, whose duty it is to arrest these criminals, has a slow reaction
time because they are not stationed on the reservation, and in
most cases must drive several hours to the victim's home on the
reservation. The lack of law enforcement presence to deter men
from abusing may contribute to the victimization rates of Ameri-
can Indian women.
The situation becomes even more severe with the increased
presence of non-Indians on the reservation. Allotted reservations
result in consistent interaction between Indians and non-Indians,
29. Id. at 103.
30. Family Relationships, DAYA, Inc., available at http://www.dayahouston.org/family-
drg.htm. (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
31. The Cherokees allow tribal police to arrest the offender, and then permit him to
raise non-Indian jurisdiction as a defense. This is a potential solution to slow reaction time
by police forces outside the reservation to domestic violence cases on the reservation.
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and even non-allotted tribal lands have recently seen an increase
in non-Indian presence due to Indian casinos and other kinds of
tourist activities that tribes engage in to revitalize their economies.
[M]any non-Indians who commit everyday misdemeanor of-
fenses on the reservations are often never prosecuted. The
hands of the tribal police are tied, and together with the in-
creasing reliance of tribal economies on tourism, which
increases the number of non-Indians visiting reservations, a
state of lawlessness and self-help justice has resulted on many
12reservations.
The fact that these "minor crimes" are not prosecuted or pun-
ished also may lead to attitudes toward reservations as territories
where crimes can be committed without any sort of redress. This
results in an "open season to assault Indians."33 Non-Indian men
are drawn to reservations for various reasons, they meet women
who they can dominate and control through force, and they get
away with abuse and continue to victimize.
The fact that American Indian women are highly victimized
when compared to other American women, coupled with the dec-
lination of prosecution of domestic violence cases by the federal
government, results in a serious problem. Regardless of the cause
of the abuse, the fact that crimes against Indian women are not
prosecuted amounts to a gross denial of justice to a segment of the
population. The University of Michigan's IGTS project with the
EBCI will show the extent to which these crimes are not prose-
cuted, and will illustrate the need for changes in the current law to
protect Indian women. Once tribes have the tools to collect data
detailing the miniscule prosecution rates of domestic violence
cases, such hard statistics will create a strong empirical case for
congressional action to reverse Oliphant. Because no such data cur-
rently exists, however, and because women are in need of
protection by their tribal governments now, the remainder of this
Note will argue the case for tribal jurisdiction over non-Indian of-
fenders even in the absence of conclusive statistics. Fairness to
tribes and the to physical and emotional integrity of Indian women
demands a change in the status quo, because what is known is that
the current system is incapable of effectively protecting these
women from domestic violence.
32. Heisey, supra note 21, at 1078.
33. Holcomb, supra note 21, at 767.
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PART II
Congressional and judicial action has left tribes powerless to
prosecute crimes, such as domestic violence, that are committed by
non-Indians on tribal lands. The primary goal of this Note is to
address the need for action on behalf of Indian women, and Part
IV will present reasons why tribal jurisdiction over crimes of do-
mestic violence is the best solution to the problem. Because tribal
jurisdiction over such crimes does not currently exist, it is impor-
tant in this Part to explain how this state of affairs came to be.
Since the 1930s Congress and the courts have taken numerous
steps away from allowing tribes the power to enforce their own
laws on their land. As one author noted, instead of simply "chip-
ping away" at tribal sovereignty, in the past fifteen years the
Supreme Court, in particular, has turned the chisel "into a
'sledgehammer' and the chinks have become 'gaping holes.'"04
Congress has done little to affect this trend. Supreme Court action
and congressional inaction indicates the federal government's in-
difference to the fact that tribal existence and prosperity depend
on the ability to protect tribal members from physical, economic,
and symbolic attacks by members of dominant society. This Part
will explain the seven Supreme Court cases framing the issues of
tribal sovereignty and, more specifically, jurisdiction over non-
members. Additionally, this Part will explain measures taken by
Congress to supplement the Court's rulings on tribal jurisdiction.
This history will provide relevant insights into how domestic vio-
lence on reservations has escalated, and how it continues to plague
Indian women because of the tribe's inability to protect them. This
history also exposes the injustices that occurred each time the
Court "chipped away" at tribal sovereignty.
A. Judicial Action
The inquiry into tribal court jurisdiction over non-Indians
begins with Worcester v. Georgia.' Worcester violated a Georgia
statute that made it a crime for a white person to reside in the
Cherokee nation "without a license or permit from his excellency
34. Heidi McNeil Staudenmaier, Tribal Sovereign Immunity: Will These Rights SurviveJu-
dicial Review?, 7 GAMING L. REv. 245, 247 (2003); see alsoHeisey, supranote 21, at 1052.
35. 31 U.S. 515 (1832).
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the governor of said state."3  Worcester claimed he had the right to
reside on Cherokee lands because he was granted permission by
the Cherokee nation, and such grant was "in accordance with the
humane policy of the government of the United States."07 He
argued that the laws of the Cherokee nation applied to him, not
those of the state of Georgia, and any attempt by Georgian
government officials to enforce their state laws on Cherokee land
was unconstitutional. Worcester supported his claim by presenting
evidence of several treaties entered into between the United States
and the Cherokee nation that "acknowledge the said Cherokee
nation to be a sovereign nation."38 The issue presented before the
Court was whether the treaties entered into between the United
States and Cherokee nation provided sufficient evidence for the
Court to conclude that the Cherokee nation was sovereign. If so,
the laws of Georgia did not apply, and Worcester could live on
Cherokee land.
The first treaty the Court examined was the Treaty of Hopewell,
signed in 1778.39 The Court read this treaty to acknowledge that
the Cherokee nation was "under the protection of the United
States, and of no other power."4° The Court cited the Ninth Article
of the treaty, which stated that the United States "shall have the
sole and exclusive right of regulating the trade with the Indians,
and managing all their affairs, as they think proper" [emphasis
added by the Court] .4' The Court thought it was necessary to high-
light the fact that this treaty gave only the United States the power
of management over the Cherokee's affairs. This important lan-
guage stressed the idea of tribes as domestic dependent nations,
dependent on the federal government, not state governments, for
support. If Georgia were permitted to simultaneously manage the
affairs of the Cherokees, such management would be inconsistent
with this article of the treaty. A nation cannot manage its affairs so
long as a state imposes its own ideas of the law.
The second treaty the Court examined was the Treaty of Holston,
signed in 1791. The Court found this treaty explicitly recognized
"the national character of the Cherokees, and their right of self gov-
ernment; thus guaranteeing their lands; assuming the duty of
36. Id. at 529.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 554.
40. Id. at 552.
41. Id. at 553.
42. Id. at 554-55.
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protection, and of course pleading the faith of the United States
for that protection; has been frequently renewed, and is now in
full force. 45 This language from the Court is a clear indication that
Worcester affirmed the sovereign nature of tribes, and the right of
tribes to self-govern on tribal lands.
The Supreme Court held that the Cherokee nation is a "distinct
community occupying its own territory, with boundaries accurately
described, in which the laws of Georgia can have no force."" An
important aspect of this holding is that Justice Marshall specified
that the laws of Georgia have no force in the territory occupied by
the Cherokee nation. This statement indicates that the Cherokee
nation has jurisdiction over all people within its territory. Although
this is primarily a restriction on the state's power to infringe on
tribal territory, Marshall made clear that the federal government
should also refrain from infringing on tribal sovereignty because
"protection does not imply the destruction of the protected."05 As
domestic dependent nations, Marshall explained that tribes should
be able to depend on federal government support, and not fear that
the federal government will strip them of their inherent sover-
eignty. However, in the cases that followed, this is exactly what
occurred.
The next Supreme Court case to define the scope of tribal juris-
diction over non-Indians was United States v. McBratney.4 6 The issue
in McBratney was whether the state of Colorado had 'jurisdiction of
the crime of murder, committed by a white man upon a white
man, within the Ute Reservation," which sat within the geographi-
cal limits of Colorado. 7 The Court again looked to the existence of
a treaty between the United States and the Ute Indian tribe to help
resolve this dispute. Similar to the treaties examined in Worcester, a
treaty signed in 1868 between the federal government and Utes
"agreed that a certain district of country ... should be set apart for
the absolute and undisturbed use and occupation" of the Utes 8 In
spite of this treaty, however, the Court found that the Utes did not
have jurisdiction over crimes that occurred on tribal lands commit-
ted by a non-Indian against a non-Indian. This determination
hinged upon the Court's examination of when the treaty was
signed in relation to the date when Colorado was admitted to the
Union. Colorado was admitted to the Union in 1875-seven years
43. Id. at 556.
44. Id. at 560.
45. Id. at 552.
46. 104 U.S. 621 (1881).
47. Id.
48. Id. at 622.
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after the treaty between the Utes and the federal government was
signed. The Court explained that because the act admitting Colo-
rado to the Union contained "no exception of the Ute
Reservation, or of jurisdiction over it," the act "necessarily repeals
the provisions of any prior statute, or of any existing treaty, which
are clearly inconsistent therewith.":' The Court found the treaty to
be inconsistent with the later act admitting Colorado into the Un-
ion because the act did not expressly except the Utes from
Colorado's jurisdiction. Such limit on a state's jurisdiction, the
Court reasoned, must be "done so by express words.,
50
This argument seems counterintuitive. The treaty was effectu-
ated before the state of Colorado was admitted to the Union, so
one would think the admission should be consistent with the exist-
ing obligations of sovereign nations. Clearly, the Court was
beginning to conceptualize tribes as less than sovereign nations,
and perhaps less than domestic dependents. McBratney communi-
cated the message that tribes could no longer rely on the federal
government for protection from the states' infringement on their
sovereignty to the extent they could under Worcester.
Draper v. United State' was the next Supreme Court case to further
define the scope of tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians. Draper, a
non-Indian, was charged with murder committed on the Crow In-
dian reservation. The issue in this case was again whether Montana
state courts had jurisdiction over Draper's crime, or whether the
case should go to federal court because the crime was committed on
the land of a domestic dependent. The facts of this case differ from
McBratney in that Montana's admission act contained language ex-
cepting the Crows from state jurisdiction. This was the key
requirement that the Utes in McBratney lacked. Montana's 1889 ad-
mission act stated that "Indian lands shall remain under the absolute
jurisdiction and control of the congress of the United States."5 One
would think that under McBratney the federal government, rather
than Montana, would have jurisdiction over the Crow's tribal lands
rather than the state of Montana because the act admitting Montana
to the Union "contained provisions taking that state out of the gen-
eral rule., 53 However, the Court further chipped at tribal sovereignty
by holding that even with this provision, the State of Montana still
had jurisdiction over Draper. The Court stated, "The mere reserva-
49. Id. at 623.
50. Id.
51. 164 U.S. 240, 241 (1896).
52. Id. at 244.
53. Draper, 164 U.S. at 243.
SUMMER 2004] 1289
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
tion of jurisdiction and control by the United States of 'Indians
lands' does not of necessity signify a retention ofjurisdiction in the
United States to punish all offenses committed on such lands by
others than Indians or against Indians."54 The Court concluded that
just because the act admitting Montana to the Union reserved to the
United States jurisdiction over Indian lands, does not mean that
Montana is now deprived of such jurisdiction.5 While this reasoning
seems to defy both Worcester and McBratney, the final holding was that
the Montana state courts, rather than the federal courts, had juris-
diction over Draper's crime. 6 This early history of allowing states to
interfere in the affairs of what are supposed to be sovereign nations
set the stage for the Court's relatively recent holdings that severely
limit a tribe's ability to protect its members.
In 1978, the Supreme Court was confronted directly with the issue
of tribal jurisdiction over non-Indian crimes against Indians on the
reservation in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe. The Court's hold-
ing, which remains good law , was that "Indian tribes do not have
inherentjurisdiction to try and punish non-Indians. 5 7 It is important
to examine the majority's opinion in this case to determine whether
the idea of tribal jurisdiction over non-Indian-on-Indian crime
should be revisited. As I will now explain, the majority's reasoning in
Oliphant is flawed and should not constitute the final word on tribal
jurisdiction or tribal sovereignty.
Oliphant stated that tribes are "quasi-sovereign" due to the fact
that, over the past 150 years, they have "ced[ed] their lands to the
United States and announc[ed] their dependence on the Federal
Government."" Because of this dependence, the Court reasoned,
tribes "necessarily g[ave] up their power to try non-Indian citizens
of the United States except in a manner acceptable to Congress."59
The Court then commenced an inquiry into whether jurisdiction
over non-Indians who commit crimes against Indians on the reser-
vation is "acceptable" to Congress.
The Court recognized that Congress never expressly made a
determination on this matter, but instead over the years revealed
an "unspoken assumption" that tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians
does not exist."O The first article of evidence the Court used tosupport its finding of Congress' unspoken assumption was a treaty
54. Id. at 245.
55. Id. at 247.
56. Id.
57. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 212 (1978).
58. Id. at 208.
59. Id. at 210.
60. Id. at 203.
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signed in 1830 between the United States and the Choctaws. The
Court stated that the Choctaws had "one of the most sophisticated of
tribal structures,""' yet still included in this treaty a "wish that
Congress may grant to the Choctaws" the right to punish non-
Indians.2 The Court reasoned that this "wish" would be unnecessary
if the tribe had inherent jurisdiction over non-Indians, because one
does not wish for something one already has.
The first problem with this piece of evidence is that the most the
Court should have read from this treaty was the "Choctaw's as-
sumption regarding the law, not the assumption of Indian tribes in
general."63 In addition to the error in applying the treaty between
one tribe and the federal government to all tribes, the Court also
made the error of disregarding other provisions in the same treaty.
The treaty stated that "the tribe is guaranteed jurisdiction and
government of all the persons and property that may be within
their limits.' ,64 If Congress wanted to ensure that tribes would not
have the power to try non-Indians, it "could have expressed that
intent more clearly than it did in the 1830 treaty."65 Therefore, one
should not read congressional intent against tribal jurisdiction into
the 1830 treaty between the United States and Choctaws.
The next article of evidence was a Western District of Arkansas
opinion from 1878.66 This opinion, reaffirmed in 1970 by the So-
licitor of the Department of the Interior, established for the Court
that tribes do not have the power to try non-Indians who commit
crimes against Indians. 67 However, as the Court noted in a foot-
note, "The 1970 opinion of the Solicitor was withdrawn in 1974. ",68
All that is left of this evidentiary finding is the 1878 Western Dis-
trict of Arkansas opinion-hardly evidence of the federal
government's intent.
The Court also relied on the Trade and Intercourse Act of 1 790,69
and an amendment to it in 1854, as evidence to support its
holding. 70 The purpose of this Act, however, was to protect Indians
61. Id. at 197.
62. Id.
63. Peter Maxfield, Oliphant v. Suquarnish Indian Tribe: The Whole is Greater than the
Sum of the Parts, 19J. CONTEMP. L. 391, 412 (1993).
64. Id. at 412 (quoting A Treaty of Perpetual Friendship, Cession and Limits, Sept. 27,
1830, U.S.-Choctaw Nation, art. IV, 7 Stat. 333, 333-34).
65. Id.
66. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 199-201 (citing Ex parte Kenyon, 14 F Cas. 353 (W.D. Ark.
1878).
67. Id. at 200-01.
68. Id. at 201 n.11.
69. Id. at 201.
70. Id. at 203.
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"from the lawlessness of the frontier inhabitants" 71 and not revoke
a tribe's jurisdiction. While this Act asserted federal, rather than
tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians, it was most likely that
"Congress intended only that some forum be assured."
7 2
The 1834 Western Territory Bill was the next piece of evidence on
which the Court relied. The Court stated that in the Bill Congress
"was careful not to give the tribes of the territory criminal jurisdic-
tion over United States officials and citizens."73 Again in a footnote,
the Court acknowledged that the bill never passed because "many
Congressmen felt that the bill was too radical a shift in United
States-Indian relations., 74 A bill that was tabled because members
of Congress did not support it cannot be taken as evidence of con-
gressional intent.
Lastly, the Court found that a 1960 Senate Report indicated that
Congress never intended for tribal courts to have jurisdiction to try
non-Indians.7' As this report did not cite any authority for the
claim that tribal courts cannot try non-Indians, however, "the most
that can be said for ... [this report] is that [it reflects] the opin-
ions of the majority of one Senate committee. ' ' 6 Again, one report
from one Senate committee cannot be dispositive evidence of con-
gressional intent.
It is clear from the Court's questionable legal foundation that
"the 'unspoken assumption' is more than likely a manifestation of
a preference of Oliphant's author that such conflicts be resolved in
favor of federal and state government rather than tribal
sovereignty., 77 In sum, "dictum in one federal district court case,
two mid-nineteenth century Attorney General opinions, a 1960
statement by a Senate committee, and a 1970 Interior Solicitor's
opinion, which was revoked in 1974, substantiate the existence of
this shared assumption." 8 Perhaps even more devastating than the
misapplications of law that occurred in this case were the
destructive effects Oliphant had on tribes throughout the nation.
When Oliphant was decided, 33 of the 127 reservations that
exercised criminal jurisdiction in the United States extended such
jurisdiction to non-Indians. 79 Additionally, this decision was
particularly devastating for tribes such as the Makah, Tulalips, and
71. Maxfield, supra note 63, at 418.
72. Id. at 419.
73. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 202.
74. Id. at 202 n.13.
75. Id. at 204.
76. Maxfield, supra note 63, at 409.
77. Heisey, supra note 21, at 1063--64.
78. Maxfield, supra note 63 at 440.
79. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 196.
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Yakima, "where the non-Indian population exceeds two-thirds of
the total reservation population."8 Where "non-Indians vastly
outnumber Indians" as is the case on "nine of the most populated
reservations,"" the tribal court systems are powerless to prosecute
those who will commit the majority of crimes on tribal lands.
Additionally unpromising for tribes was the fact that Oliphant
"laid the groundwork for the abrogation of tribal sovereignty."
82
The Court continued this trend in Duro v. Reina,83 where it held
that an Indian tribe could not assert criminal jurisdiction over a
defendant who is an Indian, unless the Indian is a member of the
tribe who seeks to assert such jurisdiction. According to Duro, "the
retained sovereignty of the tribes is that need to control their own
internal relations, and to reserve their own unique customs and so-
cial order."84 The Court described membership in tribes as having a
"voluntary character," and because there exists a "concomitant right
of participation in a tribal government," a non-member must con-
sent for a tribe to have jurisdiction.8 5 It is clear from this statement
that the Court greatly departed from the long-standing recognition
of tribes as domestic dependant sovereign nations, and instead
perceived the functions of a tribe serving no greater purpose than
that of a private club or organization. Much like the Boy Scouts of
America, tribes may only enact and enforce rules for members who
consent to the rules of the "club."
Another reason the Court believed consent-based jurisdiction
over non-members was necessary was because to hold otherwise
could result in "an intrusion on personal liberty" by subjecting a
non-member to a tribe's "legal methods [that] may depend on
'unspoken practices and norms.' ,86 This important aspect of the
Court's reasoning will be addressed in Part III.
Duro caused an "uproar" because "it created a jurisdictional void
in which neither tribes, nor states, nor the federal government had
the authority to try non-member Indians for misdemeanors
80. RUDOLF RYSER, WHEN TRIBES AND STATES COLLIDE PART II: A SPECIAL REPORT PRE-
PARED FOR THE INTER-TRIBAL STUDY GROUP ON TRIBAL/STATE RELATIONS (1999) available at
http://www.halcyon.com/pub/FWDP/Americas/collide2.txt (on file with the University of
MichiganJournal of Law Reformu).
81. L. Scott Gould, Tough Love for Tribes: Rethinking Sovereignty After Atkinson and Hicks,
37 NEW ENG. L. REv. 669, 690 (2003).
82. Maxfield, supra note 63, at 396.
83. 495 U.S. 676 (1990).
84. Id. at 685-86.
85. Id. at 694.
86. Id. at 693.
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committed on tribal lands. 8 7 Duro left tribes even more vulnerable
to crimes committed against their members on tribal lands, and
reinforced the perception that reservations are lawless lands where
one can commit a crime without the possibility of punishment. For
Indian non-members, this was certainly the case.
The most recent attempt by the Supreme Court8s to diminish
tribal sovereignty was Nevada v. Hicks."9 While the facts of this case
are not relevant to the issue of tribal criminal jurisdiction, 0 Hicks is
of great consequence because it further weakened any tribal sover-
eignty that remained after Duro. First, the Court stated that "the
Indian's right to make their own laws and be governed by them
does not exclude all state regulatory authority on the reservation.
State sovereignty does not end at a reservation's border."1 With
this finding, the Court "ignored a principle laid down almost half a
century ago-that states cannot regulate the affairs of Indians on
the reservations without authority from Congress. 9 2 In Duro, the
Court weakened the status of tribes to that of a club, and in Hicks it
allowed states to interfere with what little tribal sovereignty was
left.93 If there is any doubt that the Court conceptualized tribes as
subordinate to states, one need only look to a passage where the
Court explained that a state's extension of jurisdiction on to tribal
lands "no more impairs the tribe's self government than federal
enforcement of federal laws impairs state government. '94 The state-
tribal relationship and the federal-state relationship were made
equivalent in Hicks, thus delineating the Court's understanding of
tribal sovereignty as something subordinate to state sovereignty.
Additionally, Hicks further damaged the power of tribal courts
because the Court held that a person does not need to exhaust
claims in tribal court before seeking relief in federal court. The
Court stated that such exhaustion "'would serve no purpose other
than delay,' and is therefore unnecessary.' 95 The persistent survival
of tribal court systems through Oliphant, Duro, and now Hicks
87. Gould, supra note 81, at 686. As will be explained later in this Note, Duro has been
superseded by Congress's "Duro Fix," the Criminal Jurisdiction Over Indians Act of 1991,
Pub. L. No. 102-137 (1991).
88. One author noted that the Court's holding in Oliphani could only be reached "by
judicial activism." Maxfield, supra note 63, at 396.
89. 533 U.S. 353 (2001).
90. This case concerned the ability of a state to serve process on the reservation.
91. Hicks, 533 U.S. at 361.
92. Gould, supra note 81, at 671.
93. "Understandably, tribal advocates are concerned how far the Supreme Court may
go in further extending this intrusion into tribal affairs by the state and others." McNeil
Staudenmaier, supra note 34, at 247.
94. Hicks, 533 U.S. at 364.
95. Id. at 369.
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makes it likely that these systems serve countless purposes "other
than delay." This holding was yet another example of the appalling
ignorance exhibited time and time again through the Supreme
Court's treatment of tribal sovereignty.
The treatment of tribal jurisdiction and sovereignty in Oliphant,
Duro, and Hicks reveals a vast departure from Justice Marshall's
early recognition of tribes as domestic dependant sovereign na-
tions. However, the most recent case decided by the Supreme
Court reveals a departure from the Court's "agenda against the
sovereignty of the Indians whenever that sovereignty conflicts with
the interests of non-Indians."9 In United States v. Lara,97 the Court
stated that Oliphant and Duro reflected the Court's view of tribes'
sovereign status, but in no way set forth "constitutional limits pro-
hibiting Congress from taking actions to modify or adjust that
status."8 Rather, the Court held that Congress does possess the
power to "relax restrictions that the political branches have, over
time, placed on the exercise of a tribe's inherent legal authority."99
This decision is especially important because the Court acknowl-
edged that Oliphant and Duro "are not determinative" on the
question of tribal sovereignty and jurisdiction, because Congress is
the final authority on the status of tribes. 00 Perhaps with the
Court's invitation, Congress will take this opportunity to offer a
"determinative" answer to the question of tribal jurisdiction over
non-Indians. As will be explained below, Congressional action to
correct wrongful interpretations of the sovereign status of tribes is
not a novel idea. Congress must now take action suggested by the
Supreme Court in Lara to grant tribes more than residual jurisdic-
tion. Congress must correct the Court's holdings that perpetuate
the belief that tribal courts can only be entrusted with cases that do
not matter to federal or state officials. These holdings speak vol-
umes about the Court's opinion of tribal courts and the people
who appear before them, and as Lara noted, Congressional action
would "mak[e] all the difference.""0' It is time for Congress to
make a difference in the lives of those who suffer violence at the
96. Heisey, supra note 21, at 1062.
97. 124 S.Ct. 1628 (2004). Lara was decided during the publication of this Note, and
due to time constraints, an in-depth analysis of the Court's holding was not possible. How-
ever, it is important to mention this case as one that opens the door for a reversal of
Oliphant.
98. Id. at 1630.
99. Id. at 1631.
100. Id. at 1637.
101. Lara, 124 S.Ct. at 1637.
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hands of non-Indians on the reservation by granting tribes the
ability to protect their members.
B. Congressional Action
While the Supreme Court has been active in diminishing tribal
sovereignty and jurisdiction, Congress has taken a number of steps
to clarify jurisdiction over crimes committed on the reservation.
The first significant step was the 1817 enactment of the General
Crimes Act, which states:
Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the general
laws of the United States as to the punishment of offenses
committed in any place within the sole and exclusive jurisdic-
tion of the United States, except the District of Columbia,
shall extend to the Indian Country.
0 2
The General Crimes Act established general, catch-all federal ju-
risdiction over crimes committed on the reservation.
Public Law 28d03 was the next piece of legislation enacted by
Congress concerning the scope of tribal jurisdiction. Public Law
280 allows states to assume criminal and civil jurisdiction over
crimes committed on the reservation, via state statute or constitu-
tional amendment. However, states have not been eager to assume
such jurisdiction. Only five states, California, Nebraska, Wisconsin,
and parts of Minnesota and Oregon, became Public Law 280 when
the law was first enacted, 0 4 and since then only Alaska in 1958
signed on to become a Public Law 280 state. 0 5 That so few states
participate is hardly an endorsement of Public Law 280 as a worka-
ble solution to the problem of declination of prosecution for
crimes on the reservation. States are not eager to assert jurisdiction
over these crimes, most likely due to the fact that "states do not
have the authority to tax Indians, and they are not willing to as-
sume criminal jurisdiction over Indian lands if they cannot be
reimbursed, through taxation, for the costs of doing so. "" 6 As dis-
cussed later, even if states were willing to assume jurisdiction over
102. Codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (2004).
103. Pub. L. No. 280, 67 Stat. 588 (1953).
104. Id.
105. See Gavin Clarkson, ReclaimingJurisprudential Sovereignty: A Tribal Judiciary Analysis,
50 U. KAN. L. REv. 473, 480 n.45 (2002).
106. Holcomb, supra note 21, at 778.
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crimes committed on the reservation, this may not be in the best
interest of tribes.
The most recent action taken by Congress was its enactment of
what has been labeled the "Duro Fix." As its name suggests, Congress
amended the Indian Civil Rights Act ("ICRA") in response to the
Supreme Court's holding in Duro. With the Duro Fix, Congress ac-
knowledged the "inherent power of Indian tribes, hereby
recognized and affirmed, to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all
Indians."' °7 While Congress with this legislation restored a tribe's
ability to prosecute all Indians, rather than just its own members,
Congress did not address a tribe's ability to prosecute non-Indians.
Perhaps the fact that Congress came back after Duro with the "Duro
Fix," yet did not respond to Oliphant means that the Supreme Court
was correct in attributing to Congress an "unspoken assumption"
that tribes cannot assert criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. In-
terpreted in that light, the Duro Fix is troubling because it suggests
that Congress will not support an effort to restore tribal jurisdiction
over non-Indians. "While commentators have advocated overruling
Oliphant, they have largely ignored the congressional failure to rec-
tify, through legislation, the injustice that the decision created.'
0 8
With the Court and now perhaps Congress in opposition to such
jurisdiction, the potential outcome of this endeavor may be unprom-
ising for tribes.
This does not mean that the effort to protect Indian women
from violence by non-Indian men should be abandoned, or that
Congress will never overturn Oliphant. The IGTS project proposed
by the University of Michigan to track the disposition of cases of
domestic violence referred to federal prosecutors will provide the
EBCI with indisputable statistics that Indian women's cases are not
being prosecuted by federal authorities. Members of Congress not
moved by the erosion of historical rights may respond to statistics
detailing the forgotten victims of domestic violence on the reserva-
tion. These statistics will prove that "[i]t is time for Congress to
exercise its plenary power over Indian affairs vested in it by the
Constitution and confirmed by Chief Justice Marshall over a cen-
tury and a half ago."' 9 In the meantime, it is necessary to inform
members of dominant society about the congressional and judicial
action that has created the current situation. It is also necessary to
advocate for a solution that will be the best for Indian women, not
107. Criminal Jurisdiction Over Indians Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-137 (1991).
108. Heisey, supra note 21, at 1052.
109. Id.
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one that will simply increase prosecution rates to the level of
prosecutions for members of dominant society. The remainder of
this Note will analyze the ways in which Congress should exercise
its plenary power to respond to the issues presented thus far, in-
cluding the alarming victimization rates of Indian women and the
dishonorable treatment of tribes by the Court. With these issues in
mind, Congress will have no choice but to restore tribal sover-
eignty and jurisdiction to where it was before the Court interfered.
PART III
There are two proposed solutions to the problem of decreased
prosecution of domestic violence crimes committed against
American Indian women. These solutions are currently being im-
plemented, and are consistent with the Supreme Court's holding
in Oliphant. The first solution is to encourage states to assume ju-
risdiction over non-Indian crimes committed on the reservation;
the second is to create more specialized courts and prosecution
offices to respond to the unique needs of Indian communities.
This Part will analyze each solution, and suggest that both should
be abandoned because they are not in the best interests of Indian
women. Again, the goal should not be to simply increase prosecu-
tion rates but to provide a better system of protection to Indian
women on every level. The first potential solution to address the
problem of domestic violence on the reservation is to encourage
states to assume criminal jurisdiction over these non-Indian of-
fenders. As explained in Part II, states are allowed to assume this
jurisdiction by statute or constitutional amendment under Public
Law 280. This could be an attractive solution because it would
achieve "a uniform application of laws and ensure consistency state
wide, securing all the state's citizens, Indians and non-Indians
alike, a similar brand ofjustice.....
The first concern with this solution is that, although it allows for
"uniformity" that could perhaps lead to consistent state-wide jus-
tice, that "uniformity" would implement the state's ideas about
how to best govern its citizens, rather than the tribe's. In order to
best serve members who reside on the reservation, a tribe needs to
be able to adopt its own set of laws and procedures, suited to the
needs of its particular constituency. This is why our country ad-
heres to the idea of federalism, where each of the fifty states is
110. Jones, supra note 10, at 485.
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allowed to enact laws that best represent the particular and distinct
communities present in each state. If tribes are subordinate to the
state, rather than to the federal government, they cannot tailor law
enforcement responses to their community with the same flexibil-
ity as state governments. It is the tribal members who suffer from
this lack of flexibility to set up experimental legal systems that
might better serve their unique needs.
Another concern with state jurisdiction over these crimes is that
there is no guarantee that the needs of battered women will be
better addressed. State law enforcement agencies and prosecutor's
offices, like their federal counterparts, may be located several
hours away from the reservation. There is no guarantee that
women will feel more inclined to call state police than they would
the FBI, or that they would travel to testify at their state court any
more frequently than they would travel to their nearest federal dis-
trict court. While members of dominant society can be assured that
the city or county in which they reside will provide a cohesive sys-
tem of prosecutors and police present in their community to protect
them from victimization, there is no such assurance for Indian
women if they are forced to rely on state law enforcement agen-
cies. It is time that Indian women receive the same immediate and
responsive protection from domestic violence depended on by
women who live off the reservation.
Additionally, the solution of state jurisdiction over crimes of
domestic violence on the reservation does nothing to address the
injustice of the Oliphant decision. Part II explained how tribes were
stripped of their ability to prosecute non-Indians who commit of-
fenses on the reservation. While the primary purpose of State
jurisdiction over crimes of domestic violence also necessarily im-
pedes tribal sovereignty:
One of the clearest powers of any sovereign is the right to assert
legal jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of a nation defines the legal
and political powers that a government possesses to rule its
people and territory, including the power to make and enforce
laws, as well as the power to make final legal interpretations
when there are disagreements among the people."'
Further, state jurisdiction should not be adopted as a solution to
domestic violence because of the dilemma it creates for Indian
women. Tribal sovereignty is important to Indian men and women
111. Ryser, supra note 80.
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alike, and these men and women will not welcome anything that
further diminishes tribal sovereignty. Even if state jurisdiction
could provide greater protection for Indian women, tribes will still
not embrace it; many will see it as "an attack on tribal sovereignty
rights.""11 The result is that Indian women are faced with the im-
possible decision of choosing between tribal sovereignty and
protection from domestic violence: one must come at the expense
of the other. There is no reason to place the need for tribal sover-
eignty and the problem of domestic violence at odds with one
another, or to force women to choose between loyalty to their tribe
and a life free from abuse. State jurisdiction over non-Indian
crimes of domestic violence compels women to choose between
two aspects of their identity: their tribe and their well-being. Such
a solution is unfair, and should be abandoned. Tribal jurisdiction is
the only way to simultaneously respond to domestic violence and
restore sovereignty to the tribes, without sending the message to
women that the two goals are incompatible.
The second solution to the problems presented in this Note is to
invest more resources in the federal system, making it more local-
ized and more specialized. The federal government, working
together with the Warm Springs tribe, recently tested a version of
this solution:
The federal courts in the Ninth Circuit, in cooperation with the
Department of Justice, as well as the tribal council of the Warm
Springs tribe in Oregon, have developed a project [where a]
new part-time U.S. magistrate judge has been appointed in
Bend, Oregon, and holds court regularly at the Warm Springs
reservation. Non-Indian misdemeanor cases that slipped
through the cracks previously and went un-prosecuted (leaving
the reservation an easy mark for non-Indian petty crime), will
now be heard by the federal magistrate judge when he
convenes federal court on the reservation. The Department of
Justice also has been working to cross-designate a Warm
Springs tribal prosecutor as a special assistant U.S. attorney to
bring these cases before the magistrate judge. In addition, the
U.S. attorney for the District of Arizona has already designated
several tribal prosecutors as special assistants to help fill
jurisdictional gaps.13
112. McNeil Staudenmaier, supra note 34, at 246.
113. J. Clifford Wallace, A New Era of Federal Tribal Court Cooperation, JUDICATURE, Nov.-
Dec. 1995, at 150, 152-53.
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A solution like the one implemented at the Warm Springs reser-
vation may result in greater rates of prosecution for domestic
violence cases. Again, however, this solution does not address the
injustice of Oliphant, and will not promote the existence or crea-
tion of the tribal judiciaries that are so important to tribal
sovereignty. Many tribes may welcome this solution: a solution like
the Warm Springs plan may be beneficial for tribes that lack aju-
dicial system and that can effectively engage in a cooperative effort
with federal authorities to do what is best for tribal members.
However, tribes like the Navajo and Cherokee, who already have
very sophisticated judicial systems in place and who possess the
ability to assert jurisdiction over crimes committed against their
people, should not be forced into a Warm Springs-type system.
The problem with this modified system, then, is that it still takes
away from tribes the ability to choose whether they will build and
sustain their own judiciaries, or look to the federal government for
assistance. When Oliphant took this choice from tribes like the Na-
vajo and Cherokee, it sent a blanket statement to all tribes that
their complex judicial systems that have been in place for hun-
dreds of years are unworthy to try non-Indian men. Tribes are
eager and capable of protecting Indian women from victimization,
and it is time for Congress to allow them to do so.
PART IV
Domestic violence is a crime that will continue to kill, injure,
and traumatize Indian women as long as the federal government is
permitted to ignore these crimes. Counseling programs, shelters,
immediate police response to emergency calls, and the ability to
prevent repeated victimizations are all necessary measures in the
fight against domestic violence. Most importantly, a woman must
know that she matters: she warrants the protection of her govern-
ment and will not be left for dead. It is unacceptable to tell a
woman who cries out for help that her case is not important
enough to make the docket, and her victimizer is free to do as he
chooses. It is unacceptable to tell a woman that we will not allow
her community to protect her because the man who burned,
punched, or stalked her was not an Indian.
The best solution to the problem of domestic violence commit-
ted by non-Indian men against Indian women committed is to
allow tribes the ability to assert criminal jurisdiction over these
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crimes. Tribal police and tribal prosecutors should be permitted to
function as a cohesive unit to provide these women with efficient
protection that responds to the needs of each individual victim
from the moment she calls the police until her attacker is pun-
ished for his crimes. This solution will also facilitate the long
overdue recognition by the federal government that tribes are
domestic dependant sovereign nations. A woman will not feel
forced into choosing between this recognition and a life free from
abuse; the two can co-exist. Additionally, tribal law enforcement
agencies, like their county and municipal counterparts, will be able
to tailor their responses to domestic violence to the particular vic-
tims they are responsible for protecting. This solution will ensure
that someone will respond when a woman calls for help, and her
case will be a priority to a prosecutor whose job it is to protect her.
Tribal prosecutors are eager to protect victims in their commu-
nity by taking action against men who feel they can abuse without
consequence. Once tribes are permitted to assert jurisdiction over
the criminal acts of these abusers, the much-needed deterrent ef-
fect of the law will be realized, women will be protected from
repeat abuse, and women will know that they are not alone in their
struggle for physical and emotional integrity. As explained in Part
I, many tribal police forces have a policy against arresting non-
Indians because the tribes have no authority to prosecute these
individuals. Any arrest would be futile, because the attacker will be
free to abuse again and the tribe will be unable to stop him. Once
tribes are allowed to assert criminal jurisdiction over these offend-
ers and prosecute them for crimes committed against Indian
women, tribal police will be able to work with tribal prosecutors to
ensure justice for these women.
One should not underestimate the power of a law enforcement
agency that functions as a cohesive unit, with tribal prosecutors
and police working together to best serve the needs of their com-
munity. The criminal justice system cannot function when its two
main components-police and prosecutors-work in isolation.
What is needed is a cohesive unit of prosecutors and police work-
ing as a team to hold victimizers accountable for their abuse.
This cohesive unit works to the benefit of Indian women be-
cause, first, cases will not be lost or forgotten about in the process
of transferring information between tribes and federal prosecu-
tors. Prosecutors are dependant upon police officers for pertinent
information to build their cases; police need the guarantee from
prosecutors that when they put their lives on the line by respond-
ing to a domestic violence call, their efforts will not be fruitless
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because the victimizer they arrest will be held accountable. A team
of prosecutors and police working together is the only way to en-
sure Indian women's cases are not forgotten or ignored.
Additionally, allowing tribes to assert jurisdiction over non-
Indian criminal offenders is the best solution to the problem of
violence against Indian women because it recognizes the injustice
in Oliphant on two levels. First, it responds to the Supreme Court's
historical tendency to diminish tribal sovereignty. Members of a
tribe are not forced into the impossible decision of choosing be-
tween the tribal sovereignty they deserve, and protecting victims of
domestic violence: this solution addresses both concerns. By assert-
ing criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, tribes can better protect
their members from victimization, while at the same time building
and sustaining the judicial system necessary to any sovereign. This
solution works to benefit not only Indian women, who are the
main concern of this Note, but to all who believe that a change in
the federal government's ill treatment of tribes is desperately
needed. Tribes will finally have the authority to protect their
members in a manner consistent with their status as domestic de-
pendant sovereign nations. Again, tribes are eager to have this
opportunity, as is evident from the National Congress of American
Indians' resolution to make efforts to "[i]ncreas[e] criminal au-
thority to Indian tribes to prosecute non-Indian rapists and
batterers"14 a priority. Criminal jurisdiction over all who enter the
reservation, regardless of tribal registration or lack thereof, re-
stores a great deal of the sovereignty the Supreme Court has
stripped from tribes in the last part of the 20th century.
In spite of the Supreme Court's action and Congress's inaction,
many tribal criminal justice systems remain strong. This is the sec-
ond way in which restoring tribal jurisdiction over non-Indian
offenders responds to the ignorance of the current system: it rec-
ognizes that tribal criminal justice systems are not inferior, and
many are much more complex and sophisticated than systems serv-
ing members of dominant society. "Despite [tribes'] dependant
status, they have retained the power to manage their internal af-
fairs, and criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians is essential to
managing those affairs."0
5
For instance, tribes such as the EBCI have stringent domestic
violence codes, and have been successful in enforcing those codes
114. National Congress of American Indians, Support for the 2005 Reauthorization of the
Violence Against Women Act Including Enhancements for American Indian and Alaska Native
Women, Res. PHX-03-034, at 2 (2003).
115. Heisey, supra note 21, at 1070.
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against non-Indian offenders. The EBCI has been very creative in
making sure Cherokee women are protected from domestic vio-
lence. The Domestic Violence chapter of the Cherokee Code'
1 6
requires all persons arrested for domestic violence to be brought
before the Court."7 Only after the accused appears can he raise an
affirmative defense of lack of jurisdiction. This solution has al-
lowed the EBCI the ability to arrest and prosecute many non-
Indian offenders who would otherwise go entirely without pun-
ishment. Another tactic the tribe employs to protect Cherokee
women is utilizing the power of exclusion. Chapter 2 of the
Cherokee Code allows Tribal Counsel "the power to exclude other
persons from Cherokee trust lands when necessary to protect the
integrity and law and order on Tribal lands and territory or the
welfare of its members.""" If non-Indians will not respect the laws
the EBCI has adopted to best govern the people who reside on
tribal lands, then the EBCI will remove the offender from the res-
ervation and away from the woman he victimized.
Although often useful, the creative solutions employed by tribes
like the EBCI are not lasting solutions. Rather, they demonstrate
the resilience of the tribal criminal justice systems. Even though
few sovereign governments could withstand a prohibition against
prosecuting those who will commit the majority of crimes on that
sovereign's territory, tribal criminal justice systems have survived.
Protecting Indian women is so important to tribes like the EBCI
that they have dedicated limitless effort to finding gaps in the Su-
preme Court's holdings that will allow them to protect female
tribal members. The solutions are creative, but more importantly
they are a signal to all that these cases are too important to be ig-
nored. It is a travesty that tribes have to look for "loopholes" in the
Supreme Court's rulings to be able to protect their members. They
should be permitted to assert jurisdiction over all non-Indian of-
fenders, not just those abusers who lack access to fancy lawyers
specializing in Indian law. Tribes are willing and able to assert
criminal jurisdiction over all non-Indian offenders. Just because
the Supreme Court has not recognized the sophisticated tribal
criminal justice systems serving many tribes across the nation does
not mean they do not exist, and it is time for these systems to re-
ceive the recognition they deserve.
Tribal jurisdiction is also the best solution to the problem of
domestic violence: it is the only one that allows tribes to tailor
116. The Cherokee Code, Ch. 50B: Domestic Violence Prevention.
117. The Cherokee Code, Ch. 50B-4: Enforcement of Orders.
118. The Cherokee Code Ch. 2: Exclusion Power of the Tribe, § 2-1. Power to Exclude.
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responses to domestic violence to best serve the interests of the
Indian women. As previously mentioned, our country was founded
on principles of federalism because we believe state and local
governments can in many ways better serve their distinct
populations than the federal government. Tribes similarly have
unique ways of responding to domestic violence, and they should
be permitted to implement their responsive solutions to the
problem to the fullest extent. The EBCI's unique responses to
domestic violence are just one example. The Navajo have also
formulated distinctive responses to domestic violence. The Navajo
Peacemaker Court was created in 1982 to "formally institutionalize
the customary mediation techniques of dispute resolution that
were common among the Navajo before and after the federal
government established courts on the reservation.""" The
Peacemaker Court handles a wide variety of cases, including
criminal actions and child custody, and uses "non-adversary
methods of community participation in achieving conflict
resolution." These non-adversarial methods include "talking out"
the problem, involving family and friends in the dispute
resolution, and issuing judgments requiring the offender to
apologize or pay restitution to the victim.'2 ° Community service is
also a form of restitution that Peacemaker Courts require from
those who appear before them.12' Tribes like the Navajo should be
granted the flexibility to enact laws and regulations, and
implement specialized courts, that can most effectively respond to
the unique needs of the people they serve. Restoring tribal
criminal jurisdiction is the final, and perhaps most important step
in ensuring that tribal members reap the same benefits from our
federalist system as members of dominant society receive from city
and state governments.
Tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians is the best solution
to the problem of domestic violence on the reservation because
police and prosecutors can function as a cohesive unit, the status
of tribes as domestic dependent sovereign nations will be recog-
nized, and Indian women will benefit from government responses
tailored to their needs. This solution is necessary to ensure Indian
women receive the same quality of protection from domestic vio-
lence that members of dominant society receive. Currently, the
protection Indian women receive is impermissibly inadequate, as
119. Barbara Ann Atwood, Tribal Jurisprudence and Cultural Meanings of the Family, 79
NEB. L. REV. 577, 597 (2000).
120. Id. at 597-98.
121. Id. at 597.
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federal prosecutors do not work with federal law enforcement to
ensure protection, and tribes are not permitted to enforce sen-
tences unique to the particular circumstances of the domestic
violence victims and offenders. This solution is the only one that
can address these inadequacies while at the same time recognizing
that women need not choose between tribal sovereignty and physi-
cal and emotional integrity. It is unfair for a woman to feel as if she
is the cause of federal and state government infringement on tribal
sovereignty, or that she doesn't merit the same protection from
domestic violence as members of dominant society. Congress must
take action to solve all of these problems, and the only way it can
do so is by redressing the Supreme Court's holding in Oliphant by
restoring tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.
PART V
No matter how beneficial the effects of tribal jurisdiction over
non-Indians will be for Indian victims of domestic violence and
tribal sovereignty in general, dominant society will not allow such
jurisdiction if its concerns are not addressed. These concerns in-
clude: protection of individual rights; review of tribal court
decisions; and the possibility that not all tribes can afford to de-
velop an adequate judiciary. This Part will analyze each of these
concerns, and demonstrate why they should not prevent tribes
from asserting criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.
The first concern is that tribal courts will not protect an individ-
ual defendant's rights and liberties. The Indian Civil Rights Act
(ICRA) 1 22 imposes "most of the provisions of the Bill of Rights on
tribal governments, "0 3 as evident below:
No Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-government shall:
(1) make or enforce any law prohibiting the free exer-
cise of religion, or abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press, or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble and to petition for a redress
of grievances;
(2) violate the right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
122. 25 U.S.C.A. § 1302 (West 2001).
123. Clarkson, supra note 105, at 481.
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unreasonable search and seizures, nor issue warrants,
but upon probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to
be searched and the person or thing to be seized;
(3) subject any person for the same offense to be twice
put in jeopardy;
(4) compel any person in any criminal case to be a wit-
ness against himself;
(5) take any private property for a public use without
just compensation;
(6) deny to any person in a criminal proceeding the
right to a speedy and public trial, to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation, to be con-
fronted with the witnesses against him, to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his
favor, and at his own expense to have the assistance
of counsel for his defense;
(7) require excessive bail, impose excessive fines, inflict
cruel and unusual punishments, and in no event
impose for conviction of any one offense any pen-
alty or punishment greater than imprisonment for a
term of one year and a fine of $5,000, or both;
(8) deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of its laws or deprive any person of lib-
erty or property without due process of law;
(9) pass any bill of attainder or ex post facto law; or
(10) deny to any person accused of an offense punish-
able by imprisonment the right, upon request, to a
trial by jury of not less than six persons.
While one cannot help but notice the striking similarities
between ICRA and the United States Bill of Rights, the Supreme
Court has on numerous occasions expressed concerns that ICRA
does not provide enough protection, meaning the same protection
that a non-Indian would receive in dominant society's courts.
Oliphant certainly took into consideration this concern: while
"defendants are entitled to many of the due process protections
accorded to many defendants in federal or state criminal
proceedings ... the guarantees are not identical. Non-Indians, for
example, are excluded from Suquamish tribal court juries.",1 4 Duro
124. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 194.
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raised similar concerns when the Court noted that ICRA
"guarantees are not equivalent to their constitutional counterparts.
There is, for example, no right under the Act to appointed counsel
for those unable to afford a lawyer.',
2 5
This concern is not an insurmountable roadblock to tribal
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. First, it should be noted
that some tribes, such as the EBCI, provide even greater protections
to defendants appearing in tribal courts. For instance, every de-
fendant in a Cherokee court has the right to ajury trial, no matter
how minor the crime. Again, it is ignorance on the part of domi-
nant society to assume that different equals inferior. Sophisticated
tribal court systems like the one employed by the EBCI demon-
strate that this is not the case, yet the effect of the current
jurisdictional scheme reflects dominant society's opinion of these
courts as inferior. Note the asymmetry:
If an Indian leave the boundary of Indian country and by do-
ing so places herself outside the limit of tribal authority, the
tribe loses jurisdiction over her and the state gains jurisdic-
tion. If she then commits a crime, the state exerts it authority
and prosecutes her in state court. Likewise, there is no reason
to believe that a non-Indian who leaves the confines of the
state, enters Indian country, puts herself within the boundary
of tribal authority, and commits a crime there should not be
subject to the jurisdiction of the tribe."6
When the federal government endorses this asymmetry, it sends
the message to American Indians that the courts serving them are
not as valid as those serving members of dominant society, and that
they are far too inferior to try a member of dominant society.
These courts are not inferior, but designating a portion of the
population as immune from these courts based on tribal member-
ship sends that message. It also sends a message to the people who
depend on these courts to adjudicate the crimes committed
against them that they are receiving an inferior brand of justice,
and one that is inadequate for members of dominant society.
Additionally, it is ignorant for dominant society to assume that all
tribal courts are the same. As mentioned before, the EBCI offers
protections to defendants that far surpass those mandated by ICRA
and those found in dominant society's courts. Some tribal courts
may not offer this degree of protection to individual defendants.
125. Duro, 495 U.S. at 693.
126. Heisey, supra note 21, at 1070.
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For the Supreme Court to make a sweeping generalization that
these courts do not offer sufficient protection to defendants
without taking into account specifics of the wide variety of systems
tribal courts have implemented is reprehensible. If it is the case
that some tribal courts are found to offer insufficient protections
to individual defendants, this should not be a roadblock to all
tribes being permitted to assert criminal jurisdiction over non-
Indians. Rather, those tribes could be required to adopt certain
safeguards to ease the minds of non-Indians. Tribes could "be
required to employ federal rules of evidence and procedure, to
adopt codes of judicial and attorney conduct, to ensure separation
of governmental powers, to apply federal appellate precedents, to
permit removal, and to extend the right to appointed counsel." 7
Additionally, Congress could perhaps do away with ICRA and
require tribes to adopt the United States Bill of Rights so that the
same protections courts in dominant society provide are offered by
tribal courts. Even with these safeguards, there still exists flexibility
for tribal court systems to adjudicate in manners best suited to the
needs of those who appear before them and those who depend on
them for justice. To some degree, imposing federal procedures on
tribal courts would "Westernize" these courts, but this may be a
compromise tribes will have to make in order to assert criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians. While this compromise does noth-
ing to address the ignorance dominant society expresses when it
equates different tribal criminal justice systems with inferior systems,
it forces dominant society to abandon one of its most adamant ob-
jections to tribal criminal jurisdiction. Without this objection,
tribes will be one step closer to asserting criminal jurisdiction over
non-Indians, and therefore one step closer to being able to pro-
vide Indian women protection from domestic violence.
Another potential concern for dominant society is whether
there will be sufficient review of tribal court decisions. Dominant
society will resist allowing non-Indians to be subject to tribal courts
without the possibility of review by federal courts. A tension arises,
however, because if federal court review is allowed, there is the
possibility that "tribal courts will become inferior courts in the eyes
of non-Indian litigants who will perceive tribal courts as forums to
'dry-run' litigation, thus hindering the development of tribal
law.
," 28
127. Gould, supra note 81, at 691.
128. Jones, supra note 10, at 503-04.
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Again, this concern should not deter tribal jurisdiction over
non-Indians. Perhaps instead of review by federal district courts, a
"Court of Indian Affairs" that would be more knowledgeable about
tribal law, and solely responsible for acting as the reviewing author-
ity for tribal courts, could review these decisions. This is not a
novel idea:
In 1934, part of the original Wheeler-Howard bill, now known
as the Indian Reorganization Act, contained an additional
provision that was never adopted. This provision established a
Court of Indian Affairs. This was a court of review that was to
take the place of federal district courts in matters arising from
Indian affairs.
129
Tribal courts and the federal government should be able to find
a method of review acceptable to both. There is a "necessity for
tribal-federal court dialogue regarding how the tribal court record
will be treated by the federal judiciary, and how the federal courts
can avoid the replication of effort in developing a factual record in
order to dispense justice to litigants in a more expedient man-
ner."13 0 This is an opportunity to embark on a new level of
cooperation to evaluate an approach to justice that, although may
not have the benefit of foolproof experimentation behind it, may
benefit many people. For the sake of protecting Indian women
and strengthening tribal sovereignty, tribes should be encouraged,
or at least permitted to build and sustain vibrant judiciaries. The
federal government must work with tribes, not against them, to
ensure this occurs.
The last concern that dominant society raises when claiming
that tribes should not have jurisdiction over non-Indians is that not
all tribes will be able to afford to support a tribal judicial system.
Indeed, it is the case that some tribes may not even want to assert
such jurisdiction. "During the [Choctaw's] 1983 constitutional
referendum, tribal members were asked to decide whether 'the
tribal court's jurisdiction should be extended to include general
civil, criminal and probate matters?' The tribal members voted
'no' by a margin of more than two to one., 31 The fact that some
tribes may not want to take on this responsibility, or cannot afford
to do so, does not mean that all tribes should be denied this right.
'Just because it would be impractical for the tribes to assert
129. Heisey, supra note 21, at 1075.
130. Jones, supra note 10, at 463.
131. Clarkson, supra note 105, at 488.
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jurisdiction over these crimes due to the aforementioned
limitations does not mean that such jurisdiction cannot exist."
32
Some tribes are currently unable to afford to build judiciaries, but
this does not mean they will be unable to do so in the future. 3
Other tribes, like the Cherokee and Navajo, have sophisticated and
time-honored judicial systems already in place so that it would
require almost no adjustment at all to assume jurisdiction over
non-Indians.
Ultimately, the discussion is about the choice to do what is best
for the citizens of a particular community and the members of a
tribe. Tribes do not presently have that choice, and this is a travesty.
While " [t] ribes not wishing to participate in broader jurisdiction
should have the right to opt out,"1 34 those who are willing and able to
assert such jurisdiction should have the right to do so. Tribes that
currently do not have a judiciary in place can benefit from various
funding programs through the federal government that are avail-
able especially for the purpose of enhancing a tribe's ability to
develop or enrich a criminal justice system that will best serve the
needs of tribal members. An increase in prosecution rates of do-
mestic violence cases may lead to higher costs for tribal court
systems, but these costs are necessary. Cost-saving methods under-
taken by prosecutors of domestic violence should not be
implemented at the expense of the physical and emotional integ-
rity of Indian women. Any increase in cost related to the
protection of Indian women is necessary to ensure a segment of
the population is not denied justice on account of where she lives
or the tribal membership of her attacker.
State and federal jurisdiction over crimes of domestic violence on
the reservation does not constitute a workable solution for
Indian women. Tribal sovereignty and protection from domestic vio-
lence are both important concerns to Indian women, and both are
addressed when tribes are permitted jurisdiction over non-Indian
offenders. Those tribes with complex judicial and law enforcement
systems in place should be allowed to put them to use to protect
Indian women, and those who do not have such systems should be
permitted to explore this idea in the future. It is in the best interest
of Indian women that Congress grants tribal prosecutors the power
to stop non-Indian men from abusing without consequence.
132. Heisey, supra note 21, at 1065.
133. "The fact that tribes have not exercised this authority does not mean that they do
not possess the authority." Maxfield, supra note 63, at 403.
134. Gould, supra note 81, at 691.
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CONCLUSION
This Note has explained the necessity of Congressional action to
restore the power of tribes to prosecute non-Indians who commit
crimes against Indians on tribal lands. Part I explained the alarm-
ing victimization rates that Indian women face, and speculated that
the prosecution rates for crimes against these women will turn out
to be even more startling. Federal prosecutors cannot offer Indian
women the protection they deserve, and the numbers show that
these women are targeted by non-Indian men because there will be
no consequences. Congress must act now before another life on
the reservation is lost.
Congress must also act to undo the Supreme Court's diminution
of tribal sovereignty over the years, which has resulted in tribes re-
taining a level of sovereignty hardly above that of a private club or
social organization. Oliphant reflected the ignorant notions of
tribal government that members of the Court share, and cases
since have only perpetuated this trend. Oliphant was wrongly de-
cided, and fairness requires Congress to take action to return
tribes to the status of "domestic dependents" described by Marshall
in the 1830s.
The solution is clear: Congress must make an unambiguous
statement to the Supreme Court and exercise its plenary power
over Indian nations by allowing tribes to assert criminal jurisdic-
tion over those members of dominant society who victimize
Indians every day. Tribes need to be able to do this for their mem-
bers, and for their existence. It is time for Congress to begin an era
of responsible cooperation between the federal government and
Indian nations.
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